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Improving blood safety and availability: a collective 
mindfulness perspective in the supply chain 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose: Maintaining a safe and available supply of blood requires a mindfully coordinated 
supply chain (SC) and is fundamental to the effective operation of health systems across the 
world. This study investigates how blood supply chain (BSC) actors demonstrate collective 
mindfulness (CM) principles in their operations and how these demonstrations lead to 
improvements in blood safety and availability (BSA) in different operational contexts.
Design/methodology/approach: Six case studies drawn from two contrasting BSCs, the UK and 
Indonesia, which differ in structure and regulation are investigated in this research. Qualitative 
data are collected and analysed using template analysis. 
Findings: The cases reveal how the CM principles are demonstrated in a range of operational 
conditions and their impact on BSA. The BSC actors in the more centralised and tightly regulated 
cases display more behaviours consistent with more of the CM principles over a greater range of 
operational conditions compared to those in the more decentralised and loosely regulated cases. 
As such, more improvements in BSA are found in the former compared to the latter cases. 
Originality/value:  This paper is considered the first to investigate the demonstration of CM 
principles at the SC as opposed to the single organisational level. It proposes an alternative 
approach to understanding and evaluating reliability performance using behavioural rather than 
statistical principles.
Keywords: Blood, safety and availability, system reliability, collective mindfulness, theory 
elaboration, template analysis 
Paper type: Research paper 
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Introduction
Blood is a precious resource, critical for the human body. It is also perishable; requiring 
a coordinated temperature-controlled supply chain (SC) to maintain high quality (see 
Turnbull, 1989; Van Donselaar et al., 2006). Reliable blood supply chain (BSC) 
operations are essential to ensure that blood products are always safe and available, 
saving lives whilst minimising wastage. Damaged blood units or those contaminated by 
infectious disease should never be transfused. Stock-outs of blood products delay 
transfusions and operations, directly affecting patients’ lives, whilst outdated blood leads 
to wastage resulting in increased costs to the SC overall.  
Given the criticality of blood products for human life, ensuring blood safety and 
availability (BSA) remains a perennial challenge (WHO, 2020). The degree to which BSA 
is achieved in the BSC essentially reflects the reliability of the healthcare system and is 
a key indicator of effective BSC management. Traditionally, a statistical approach has 
been used to measure system reliability, quantifying the number of failures as 
percentage of total relevant events (see Roberts, 1990). However, this has been 
criticised as being too rigid; some systems which frequently fail are still categorised as 
highly reliable because their success rate is much higher than their failure rate. As such, 
researchers argue that one should not only focus on failure and success rates, but more 
importantly understand the process by which organisations achieve system reliability 
(see Rochlin, 1993; Hopkins, 2007). In other words, more research should be focussed 
on identifying the processes and practices that help organisations achieve and maintain 
highly reliable operations (Hopkins, 2007). 
Embracing this process driven orientation, Weick et al. (1999) argue that system 
reliability can be achieved through organisations being mindful of their operations. As 
such, people working together within highly reliable organisations are collectively 
mindful, following a wide range of processes and exhibiting a variety of behaviours that 
demonstrate their preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretation, 
sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference of decisions to those 
with expertise (Weick et al., 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, 2015). It is argued that 
collective mindfulness (CM) manifests itself when there is interaction between individuals 
who carefully coordinate their actions (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2012, Morgeson and 
Hofmann, 1999, Weick et al.,1999). By extension, CM is the work of paying attention to 
and making sense of available information distributed amongst members of an 
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organisation (see Curtis et al., 2017), hence, mindful information sharing is fundamental 
in defining CM.  
At the SC level, information sharing often happens between the organisations which form 
the chain (Lusiantoro et al., 2018). In the BSC context, mindless interorganisational 
information sharing (IOIS) can lead to failure in BSC coordination, creating blood safety 
and availability incidents which are potentially fatal for patients (see SHOT, 2016, 2017, 
2018). For example, a blood centre’s failure to detect and share information with its 
associated hospital on the delivery of a wrong blood component caused serious harm in 
a patient receiving the wrong blood transfusion (SHOT, 2016). IOIS could therefore 
demonstrate the collective efforts of SC actors to mindfully manage and coordinate their 
interdependent operations, maintaining reliable performance and minimising failures 
(see Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2012; Weick et al., 1999). 
Despite the important role of CM and its potential application in SC operations, empirical 
research linking CM and SC reliability from the process perspective is currently lacking. 
CM has most commonly been studied in the context of high reliability organisations 
(HROs) that deal with highly hazardous environments. Whilst Weick et al. (1999) suggest 
that CM could be used to understand reliability across inter-organisational networks and 
many theories have been used to study inter-organisational coordination (see Kembro 
et al., 2014), the extension of CM concept to the SC level is currently scant in the 
literature (see Sawyerr and Harrison, 2020). In addition, theoretical perspectives 
including CM have not been significantly used in the BSC literature which has focussed 
instead on quantitative rather than process and behavioural approaches to inventory 
optimisation, supply management, and scheduling the distribution of blood products to 
maintain blood safety and availability (see Beliën and Forcé, 2012; Pirabán et al., 2019), 
ignoring the potentially vital role of people in achieving reliability. Therefore, our 
understanding on how CM could influence blood safety and availability across the BSC 
remains absent. 
To address this important research gap, in this research, we investigate CM in the BSC 
context using blood safety and availability as an exemplar of SC reliability performance. 
We seek to answer the following research question:  
RQ: How does supply chain actors’ collective mindfulness influence blood safety and 
availability? 
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We specifically aim to investigate how BSC actors demonstrate CM principles through 
their IOIS behaviour and how these demonstrations could lead to improvements in blood 
safety and availability in different operational contexts. To achieve this aim, we 
investigate six cases of two BSCs with different structure and regulation (the UK and 
Indonesian cases). We find that the demonstrations of CM principles across the cases 
leads to improvements in blood safety and availability, and that the magnitude is different 
given the different structure and regulation of the BSCs.  
The rest of the paper now proceeds as follows. We present a brief review of literature 
relevant to the study. We then describe our multiple case study methodology before 
presenting the findings, discussion, and finally concluding the paper. 
Literature Review  
Researchers have taken different approaches to understand the notion of system 
reliability. From industrial and manufacturing system contexts, Kirkmant (1963) as cited 
in Souza et al. (2020:134) first defines system reliability as the state of working or failed, 
that is “the probability that a technological system will operate correctly for a given period 
in a given environment”. Whilst system reliability can help organisations make successful 
decisions, Souza et al. (2020) argue that current research in system reliability has 
focussed mostly on “local decisions”, such as the health and productivity of an individual 
equipment, rather than the entire organisational processes. They emphasise that “in 
today's volatile and complex businesses, local decisions are no longer sufficient; it is 
necessary to analyze the organization entirely. Thus, being aware of the impacts that a 
local failure can impose on the entire company has significant weight in the decision-
making process” (Souza et al. (2020:133). 
From an organisational decision-making perspective, system reliability can stem from 
organisational routines that incorporate “repeatable packages of decision rules and 
associated actions” to reduce errors and variation in outcomes (Butler and Gray, 
2006:214). “Routine-based reliability involves the creation and execution of standard 
operating and decision-making procedures” embedded in structured and standardised 
processes within an organisation (Spender, 1989 as cited in Butler and Gray, 2006:214). 
Kydd (1989) and Butler and Gray (2006), however, suggest that whilst structured 
processes and routines can significantly improve system reliability under stable 
conditions, they are not so effective under dynamic conditions that require adaptive 
decision-making approaches.  
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On the other hand, Roberts (1990) defines system reliability in terms of achieving 
exceptional safety records that ultimately lead to what they classify as high reliability 
organisations (HROs). It is argued that “one can identify this subset [of organisations that 
have high safety records] by answering the question, “how many times could this 
organisation have failed resulting in catastrophic consequences that it did not? “If the 
answer is on the order of tens of thousands of times the organisation is “high reliability”” 
(Roberts, 1990:160). Rochlin (1993:17), however, argue that “what distinguishes 
reliability-enhancing organisations, is not their absolute error or accident rate, but their 
effective management of innately risky technologies through organisational control of 
both hazard and probability”. Hopkins (2007:6) adds that “[the research] moves away 
from questions of just how safe does an organisation have to be before it can be 
considered an HRO, and highlights instead what an organisation needs to do in order to 
reach the required end state”. This advocates a process-oriented view of HROs as 
reliability-enhancing organisations, rather than a probabilistic approach to system 
reliability.  
Reliability in an HRO requires a strong organisational safety culture, characterised by 
leadership commitment to safety, a shared belief in the importance of safety across the 
organisation, open communication based on trust, organisational learning, teamwork, 
and a non-punitive approach to adverse event reporting and analysis (Halligan and 
Zecevi, 2011). A cornerstone of safety culture is informed culture (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007), defined by Goswami et al. (2009:6) as:  
“[…] an organizational culture that encourages reporting of errors and near misses, a 
culture that is just in terms of apportioning error when things go wrong, a culture that is 
flexible enough to be able to adapt to sudden and radical increases in pressure, pacing and 
intensity of organizational operations, and a culture that enables members of the 
organization to use lessons learnt from past experiences to guide present operations and 
assumptions.”  
Informed culture encourages information sharing as a way to support collective 
organisational mindfulness, a notion that could serve as a complement to organisational 
routines operating in dynamic environments (Butler and Gray, 2006) and an important 
approach to understand how organisations achieve high reliability performance (Weick 
et al., 1999).  
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Collective mindfulness 
Collective mindfulness (CM) developed from the Western perspective of individual 
mindfulness (see Weick et al., 1999). Instead of being based on meditation as in the 
Buddhist thought tradition of its Eastern counterpart, the Western perspective of 
individual mindfulness is defined more universally as “a flexible state of mind in which 
we are actively engaged in the present, noticing new things and sensitive to context” 
(Langer, 2000:220). “People act less mindfully when they rely on past categories, act on 
“automatic pilot,” and fixate on a single perspective without awareness that things could 
be otherwise” (Weick and Putnam, 2006:280).  
CM is more than the sum of each individual’s mindfulness. It is a manifestation of the 
mindfully interacted behaviours carried out by the combined members of the organisation 
rather than the intrapsychic processes inside the head of each member of the 
organisation (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2012, Butler and Gray, 2006). The practices of CM 
have most commonly been researched in studies of high reliability organisations (HROs) 
such as nuclear power plants, aircraft carriers, air traffic control systems, and healthcare 
operations, characterised by their ability to sustain almost “error-free” performance over 
long periods of time (Roberts, 1993; Sutcliffe, 2011). Researchers have also explored 
HRO theory in ordinary low hazard environments (Zohar and Luria, 2003) which also 
present a need for reliable operations, such as healthcare (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007a, 
b). In HROs, CM manifests as a dynamic social process, characterised by extensive, 
real-time information sharing reflecting the shared behaviours of the organisational 
members to manage their interdependent operations (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2012). CM, 
through the lens of information sharing relates as much to the distribution of decision-
making rights as it does to the capabilities of the individual (Butler and Gray, 2006). For 
example, as described in Kudesia (2019:418), “product engineers may receive 
information flows about an unexpectedly high number of broken products returned under 
warranty”, however, if they do so with poorly structured information flows, they still will 
not be able to diagnose the problem correctly – proper information sharing will allow them 
to enact metacognitive processes allowing them to diagnose the problem.   
In practice, collective mindfulness theory (CMT) is characterised as following the five 
core theoretical principles of mindful organising (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, 2015). At a 
collective level, demonstrating these principles contributes to the process of achieving 
reliable performance in an organisation, all of these can be linked to information sharing: 
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1. Preoccupation with failure (PF). This principle relies on the sharing of information 
on failures, minor failures and near misses. Organisations which demonstrate this 
principle will thoroughly investigate near misses and incidents to understand the 
lessons learnt and procedures are frequently updated. People are rewarded for 
spotting errors and articulating potential mistakes. PF shows precaution, failure 
reporting, and openness (Weick et al., 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, 2015; 
Lekka, 2011). 
2. Reluctance to simplify (RS). Communication patterns and cognitive limitations 
lead to situations where unique information is not shared. Therefore, 
organisations demonstrating this principle keep redundant systems as back-ups. 
It is divergence not the commonalities which are key to detecting anomalies, 
scepticism and error spotting are encouraged to avoid making assumptions. RS 
also shows checks and balances (Ibid.). 
3. Sensitivity to operations (SO). Organisations demonstrating this principle seek to 
understand the big picture of their operation through transparency as well as 
regular and real time interactions. Sharing information is crucial, combining 
multiple perspectives to build a collective story.  They encourage speaking up, 
monitoring operations, and ongoing operational adjustments preventing errors 
from cumulating (Ibid.). 
4. Commitment to resilience (CR). This principle embraces preparedness by 
developing the capacity to cope with unexpected events. Organisations quickly 
respond when unexpected events occur, rapidly pooling knowledge to handle 
events which were impossible to anticipate. Sets of contacts are quickly 
developed to help solve problems as they occur. CR also shows recovery and 
growth from disruptions (Ibid.). 
5. Deference to expertise (DE). With this principle, when something out of ordinary 
happens, information is shared regardless of hierarchical rank. Recognising that 
expertise is not always held at the top of the organisation. Organisations  
embrace a flexible decision-making structure and encourage a collective rather 
than an authoritative decision-making process (Ibid.). 
Through these five principles, collective knowledge of failures, potential for recovery and 
relevant past experience are mindfully processed, providing the context in which present 
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operations make sense or can be reconstructed to make sense (Weick et al., 1999). 
Therefore, collective knowledge (i.e. shared information) is collective mindfulness and 
information sharing gives us a useful way of measuring it. Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) 
further classify these CM principles according to when they are demonstrated. PF, RS, 
and SO are categorised as the principles of anticipation which are typically demonstrated 
under normal conditions (i.e. when there are no unexpected events interrupting 
operations), whereas CR and DE are typically seen once unexpected events occur. For 
example, when a wildfire blows out of control and becomes catastrophic, CR and DE are 
demonstrated to contain the impact. CR and DE are categorised as the principles of 
containment which are commonly identified in emergency conditions.  
Collective mindfulness and the blood supply chain 
The BSC requires operations which are always reliable. Perishability of blood products 
and uncertainty in both demand and supply makes the BSC complex, requiring 
operations which run to exacting standards (Beliën and Forcé, 2012). Blood products 
must be held in temperature-controlled facilities and stored and transported in 
compliance with stringent safety and quality regulations. A series of continuous logistical 
processes are required, connecting the donor to the patient, ensuring demand is satisfied 
in a timely manner regardless of the operating conditions, conscious that failure to 
provide safe blood can ultimately lead to a patients’ death. As such, appropriate 
coordination mechanisms including IOIS (see Li and Wang, 2007) are required to 
synchronise activities across the BSC (WHO, 2020). 
Despite the requirement for high levels of reliability in the BSC, there is no research 
which we are aware of which uses the principles of CM to understand reliability in the 
BSC context, the extant literature in this area has focussed more on using mathematical 
model and optimisation to study reliability (e.g. Diabat et al., 2019; Rahmani, 2019; 
Samani and Hosseini-Motlagh, 2019). However, a considerable amount of research has 
adopted the idea of CM in the more general healthcare context. For example, Vogus and 
Sutcliffe (2007a, b), and Vogus et al. (2010) use the five core CM principles to explore 
safety practices in healthcare providers. Their research shows that CM enables people 
in healthcare organisations to communicate safety problems, reduce errors, and to 
elaborate learning from failures resulting from their actions (Vogus et al., 2010). As such, 
the demonstrations of CM principles have been associated with both lower medication 
errors and patient falls in hospitals (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007a).  
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Despite the extant applications of CM in the general healthcare operations, they are only 
studied in a single organisational rather than supply chain context, where catastrophic 
events can potentially happen, particularly when IOIS is difficult to achieve and the 
complex system is hard to comprehend (Turner, 1976; Weick et al., 1999). In addition, 
the most recent systematic review of the BSC literature shows a lack of theoretical 
perspectives used to understand the BSC phenomenon (see Pirabán et al., 2019). Most 
of the reviewed studies are quantitative (operations research) papers, overlooking the 
pivotal role of people (see Stanger et al., 2012) and the coordination mechanisms that 
could potentially give us a better understanding of the BSC actors’ CM and its influence 
on blood safety and availability. Our research fills this gap. We investigate the extent to 
which CM principles are demonstrated through IOIS behaviours and explain how the 
demonstrations of CM principles could lead to BSA improvements in normal, high tempo, 
and emergency conditions. Figure 1 illustrates the initial theoretical framework 
developed for the purpose of this research. 
Figure 1. Initial theoretical framework of collective mindfulness in the blood supply 
chain
Methodology 
We use a theory-elaborating case study (Ketokivi, 2006; Ketoviki and Choi, 2014), 
applying Collective Mindfulness Theory (CMT) to the context of the BSC. To achieve the 
study objectives, we use an abductive strategy, going back and forth between the theory 
and the empirical data (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014) to determine plausible explanations for 
the phenomenon (see Harman, 1965; Ketokivi, 2006; Merton, 1957).  
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Case selection and description 
To ensure the richness and accuracy of the research (see Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010; 
Yin, 2003), we select six cases from two contrasting contexts, distinct in regulation and 
centralisation; the UK BSC – Context 1 and the Indonesian BSC – Context 2. 
Governmental approaches to funding and managing healthcare vary across the world. 
The approach to funding has a direct influence on how healthcare supply chains, 
including those supplying blood are structured and regulated. Four primary approaches 
exist, and the two contexts included in this study follow radically different approaches, 
fundamentally impacting on how the supply chains operate (Dobrzykowski, 2019). 
Healthcare in the UK follows the Beveridge model, with a centralised National Health 
Service funded exclusively by the government. National Health Service Blood and 
Transplant (NHSBT) is part of this centralised system and is solely responsible for 
managing all blood supply processes including blood collection, testing, manufacturing, 
stock holding, and distribution of blood across the UK. In addition, BSA in the UK is 
governed by tight national regulations under the Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA). The regulations cover many issues including minimum 
national stock levels, traceability of blood products, and mandatory reporting of blood 
safety incidents.  
In contrast, the Indonesian healthcare system is made up of a mixture of public and 
private organisations and funding with a decentralised public system administered in line 
with the government system in Indonesia. The blood supply chain mainly sits in the 
charitable sector, managed on a decentralised basis by the Indonesian Red Cross 
(Palang Merah Indonesia – PMI).   Each of 414 blood centres (Ministry of Health Republic 
of Indonesia, 2017, 2018) is individually responsible for collecting, manufacturing, 
holding stock, and distributing blood and blood products to hospitals within its operational 
area. National regulation of standards for blood transfusion do exist covering processes 
such as blood quality management, blood donation, and cold chain process.  However, 
the regulations are not comprehensive with some governance aspects, such as national 
guidelines on the appropriate clinical use of blood and a national haemovigilance system 
lacking (WHO, 2017). Effective national or local systems are not in place to assist BSC 
operators in complying with the regulations and as a consequence not all BSC actors 
follow the prescribed standard (Director of National Blood Donation and Hospital of the 
Indonesian Red Cross, interview data). 
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The differences in funding, structure, and regulation of our contrasting contexts will allow 
our cases to provide an interesting, rich, and comprehensive understanding of the CM 
phenomenon demonstrated through IOIS, increasing the theoretical generalisability of 
the research. Theoretically, Weick et al. postulate that some degree of centralisation is 
required to support the demonstration of CM principles potentially in a supply chain 
context (see Weick et al., 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). Additionally, regulation 
provides a way to establish measures, rules, procedures or guidelines leading to higher 
reliability operations (La Porte and Thomas, 1995; Lekka, 2011). There is however, a 
danger that strict regulation will encourage routine based rather than mindfulness-based 
reliability leading to mindless actions, which hinder the mindful detection of unexpected 
changes in the organisation’s environment (Butler and Gray, 2006; Kutsch et al., 2013; 
Sitkin et al., 1994; Weick et al., 1999). In fact, WHO (2020) recommends that nationally 
integrated and regulated blood supply networks are required to ensure BSA.   
Each case consists of one blood centre and four associated hospitals, giving a total of 
30 participating entities. The number of cases selected is in line with Eisenhardt’s 
(1989a) suggestion that the ideal number of cases is between four and ten. Table 1 
provides details of the selected cases from both BSC contexts. To maintain 
confidentiality, the names of the blood centres (BC) and the hospitals are coded. 
The cases were selected using a convenience approach (see Aggarwal and Srivastava, 
2016; Pagell and Krause, 1999). The three blood centres and their associated hospitals 
in the UK were chosen based on the recommendation of the National Health Service 
Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) Blood Stocks Management Scheme (BSMS) Manager. 
Similarly, the three blood centres in Indonesia were selected following discussion with 
the Director of National Blood Donation and Hospitals of the Indonesian Red Cross 
(PMI). Given the decentralised structure of the Indonesian BSC, the selection of the four 
hospitals associated with each blood centre was based on the recommendation of the 
blood centre manager. The selection of the cases considered the different sizes, 
locations, and blood inventory management practices of the entities. This variety ensures 
the validity and rigour of the cases, reduces bias in the data (see Stanger, 2013) and 
enables the identification of as many different IOIS behaviours and hence CM principles 
as possible. 
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Over 250 - Head of Hospital Customer Service  
National Lead Patient Blood Management 
Practitioner Team 
National Product Manager 
Assistant Director Governance and Resilience  
Case 1-1 BC 1-1 49 - Hospital Services Team Manager  
SG Hospital - University Teaching Hospital 
Lead Transfusion Practitioner, Transfusion 
Practitioner  
FP Hospital - General Hospital  
Lead Transfusion Practitioner, Transfusion 
practitioner, Biomedical Scientist 
W Hospital - 
General or District General 
Hospital 
Chief Biomedical Scientist the Transfusion 
Manager  
WH Hospital - District General Hospital 
Blood Transfusion Coordinator and Quality 
Lead,, Associate Practitioner, Biomedical 
Scientist  
Case 1-2 BC 1-2 13 - Hospital Services Manager  
JR Hospital - University Teaching Hospital 
Laboratory Manager, Transfusion Practitioner, 
Project Development Manager 
WP Hospital - 
General or District General 
Hospital 
Transfusion Practitioner, Senior Biomedical 
Scientist 
NG Hospital - 
General or District General 
Hospital 
Operational Manager Transfusion and 
Haematology 
SM Hospital - 
General or District General 
Hospital 
Lead Biomedical Scientist 
Case 1-3 BC 1-3 15 - Hospital Services Manager 
RB Hospital - 
General or District General 
Hospital 
Transfusion Head Biomedical Scientist and 
Clinical Transfusion Services Manager 
SHG Hospital - University Teaching Hospital Blood Transfusion Section Manager 
QA Hospital - General Hospital 
Blood Transfusion Operations Manager, BMS 
Section Leader 
BNH Hospital - District General Hospital 








Central PMI 2,869 - Director of National Blood Donation and Hospital 
Case 2-1 
BC 2-1 75 - 
Blood Donation and Marketing Manager, Blood 
Storage and Distribution Manager, Project 
Development Manager, Staff of Blood Testing 
Department, Quality Control Manager 
PMU 
Hospital 
- General Hospital Laboratory Manager, Transfusion Practitioner 
KI Hospital - General Hospital Laboratory Manager, Blood Bank Manager 
HM Hospital - General Hospital Medical Consultant, Laboratory Manager 








Hospital types Respondents  
Case 2-2 
BC 2-2 150 - 
Head of City Red Cross, Blood Donation 
Manager, Blood Management General Affairs 
PR Hospital - General Hospital Deputy Laboratory Manager 
BT Hospital - General Hospital Blood Bank Staff 
AK Hospital - General Hospital Blood Bank Manager, Blood Bank Staff 
SD Hospital - Mother and Children Hospital Midwife 
Case 2-3 BC 2-3 7 - Transfusion Practitioner 
MD Hospital - General Hospital Senior Nurse, Nurse 
TR Hospital - General Hospital 
Hospital General Affairs, Blood Administration 
Manager 
IS Hospital - General Hospital Two nurses 
PMA Hospital - General Hospital Nurse 
Data collection 
Primary data were collected through face-to-face semi-structured interviews (INTs) with the 
key personnel responsible for ensuring BSA in their respective blood centres or hospitals. In 
total 58 respondents were interviewed (29 UK and 29 Indonesian). The length of the interviews 
varied between 30 minutes to 2.5 hours. The interviews began with general questions on the 
respondents’ role and the extent to which they were involved in managing BSA in the blood 
centre or hospital. Subsequently, the respondents were asked to describe how they 
(representing the blood centre or hospital) used IOIS to ensure BSA in normal, high tempo, 
and emergency conditions as the theory predicts that collective mindfulness principles will be 
demonstrated differently under differing operational conditions. We asked detailed questions 
as to what, how, with whom, and how often information is shared across the BSC.  
Normal conditions represent business as usual operations where there are no particular 
events that might significantly affect blood safety and availability (BSA).  High tempo 
conditions are those where events occur which cause sudden changes in BSA. These 
conditions include internal events (e.g. blood safety incidents, blood shortage, local stock-
outs, overstocks) and external events (e.g. Christmas, Easter, Bank Holiday, Olympic Games) 
that cause “turbulence” (i.e. manageable changes or fluctuations in BSA) within the BSC. High 
tempo events may be unexpected, anticipated, or cyclical in nature. Finally, major unexpected 
events, such as major haemorrhages, major traffic accidents, fridge failures, floods, terrorist 
attacks, cyber-attacks, national stock-outs, and any other unexpected events causing high 
levels of disruption within the BSC, are categorised as emergency conditions.  
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Following the interviews, walkthroughs (WTs) in the form of blood centre and laboratory tours 
were conducted to understand how operationally IOIS ensured BSA. The walkthroughs lasted 
between 30 minutes and one hour and were tape-recorded. Supporting documents (DCMTs), 
artefacts (ARTFs) and/or archives (ARs) were also collected when applicable. This 
triangulation of data sources helped to ensure the accuracy of the data and the credibility and 
robustness of the research (Jick, 1979; Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010; Rothbauer, 2008). The 
data collection protocol was initially pilot tested with seven BSC practitioners (3 from the UK 
and 4 from Indonesia) to ensure that the respondents would understand the questions and to 
prevent misinterpretation that could lead to biased results. 
Data analysis 
All interviews were transcribed, coded, and analysed using template analysis, a thematic data 
analysis technique which allows flexibility of coding structure, defining tentative a priori 
themes, and an iterative process for applying, modifying, and re-applying the initial template 
(King, 2012). This technique is suitable for studying the underlying mechanisms of a 
relationship between constructs (see Lusiantoro et al., 2018) and allows the elaboration of a 
priori concepts in the coding process.  
In the first stage of the coding process, we focussed on investigating how the CM principles 
were demonstrated through information sharing between blood centres and their associated 
hospitals. Blood centres supply blood to meet demand in hospitals, this direct relationship 
makes them the most important participants in the BSC. As such, we use the term “BSC 
actors” to refer to blood centres and hospitals throughout this paper. In this study, we assess 
CM as the extent to which the IOIS behaviours and practices observed demonstrate the five 
CM principles discussed in the literature review section. The more principles demonstrated 
through IOIS, the more collectively mindful is the BSC case. To do this, we conducted 
explanation building (Yin, 2014) via the following coding process: 
1. First order coding identified excerpts specifically related to IOIS from the transcripts 
using an in vivo technique, where labels were assigned to the excerpts using words or 
short phrases taken from the excerpts themselves (King, 2008).  
2. The IOIS behaviour amongst the BSC actors was categorised in terms of content, 
modality, direction, and frequency of IOIS (see Kembro and Näslund, 2014; see also 
Mohr and Nevin, 1990) in normal, high tempo, and emergency conditions. 
3. The co-actions underpinning the IOIS behaviours (i.e. what the BSC actors were really 
trying to do with the IOIS) were matched with the a priori themes, the detailed elements 
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of CM principles derived from a comprehensive review of current thinking on CM (i.e. 
Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, 2015; Weick et al., 1999; Lekka, 2011).  
The second stage of the coding process interpreted the impact of demonstrating each element 
of CM on BSA. As such, we used an inductive approach and the results are indicative rather 
than exact measures of the impacts. We then grouped the impacts into different categories of 
changes in BSA conditions before and after information is shared. In line with WHO (2020) 
and Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT) (2016), blood safety covers issues, such as virus 
contamination, patient reaction to transfusion, blood quality, and safety-related 
issues/incidents, both in blood centres and their associated hospitals. Blood availability refers 
to blood stock levels or sufficiency both in blood centres and their associated hospitals. 
Measures such as stockout, overstock, and wastage are also included within blood availability. 
Table 2 illustrates how the coding was structured around contexts, interventions, mechanisms, 
and outcomes to answer the research question.  
Within-case and cross-case analyses 
Upon completion of the template analysis, within-case analysis was conducted by examining 
the demonstrations of the CM principles for each operational condition (i.e. in normal, high 
tempo, or emergency) for each case in each context. Cross-case analysis was then conducted 
to compare and contrast the CM principles identified in the cases across the two contexts. 
Within-case analysis identified the patterns of data within each case to understand the studied 
phenomenon from the perspective of a stand-alone entity (Voss et al., 2002). Whereas, cross-
case analysis sought to identify replication of the findings across cases (Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989a, 1989b; Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010; Voss et al., 2002; 
Yin, 2014). The ultimate aim of these analyses is “to build a general explanation that fits each 
individual case, even though the cases will vary in their details” (Yin, 2014:148). The process 
for conducting within-case and cross-case analyses in this research was adapted from 
Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) and Martin and Eisenhardt (2010), who have provided clear 
practical guidance on the notion of replication logic. 
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Table 2: Examples of template analysis coding




































Being precautious of 
the weak signal of 
blood quality 
problem 
Precaution PF Prevented usage 






“Sometimes people just don’t like the look of 
something. And you know if you don’t like the 
look of a product, people phone up and say 
you know I don’t like the look of the product. 
But it’s not often that we get a quality 
problem.” INT – Blood Transfusion 
Coordinator and Quality Lead WH Hospital 
Case 1-1
WH Hospital 
(INT 1, WT 1) 
High tempo Blood shortage and 
product substitution; 

















“So generally we will get a fax and an email 
to say that there is a shortage of the blood 
component and we are advised to use 
substitutions.” INT – Transfusion Practitioner 
SG Hospital Case 1-1 
BC 1-1 (INT 4), 
W Hospital 
(INT 3), SG 
Hospital (INT 
3), FP Hospital 
(INT 2)
Emergency Order information; 
OBOS and telephone; 
hospital→blood 
centre; ad hoc
Being responsive in 
addressing the 



























“So if the patient is O neg and they are 
bleeding very heavily, then we probably 
would need to get some blood down very 
quickly for them. If they are O pos, we’ve 
probably get plenty of stock to support them 
until [they get what they need] and then we 
may need to get some more afterwards. If 
someone’s [condition is] very complicated or 
they are going to [use up] our stock like 
nobody’s business, then we would order blue 
light from NHSBT. And you have to have 
consultant, named consultant to authorise a 
blue light delivery. And it’s very clear on the 
OBOS, you can click blue light, you have to 
put all those details in and then you click 
send and then you follow it up with phone 
call, just to let them know that it’s coming 
through.” INT – Transfusion Practitioner FP 
Hospital Case 1-1
BC 1-1 (WT 1; 
DCMT 1), SG 
Hospital (WT 
2), FP Hospital 





This section outlines the main findings of this research. The first part describes the 
demonstration of the CM principles, and the second part explains how demonstration of the 
CM principles leads to improvements in blood safety and availability.  
Demonstration of the CM principles 
Our findings show that the CM principles are demonstrated across a range of operational 
conditions in both contexts. The following subsections describe this in more detail.  
Preoccupation with failure (PF) 
Our findings show that BSC actors demonstrate their preoccupation with failure through the 
IOIS behaviours of precaution and failure reporting, in normal and high tempo conditions 
across all cases in Context-1 and Case 2-1 in Context-2.  
For example, showing precaution, under normal conditions, WH Hospital in Case 1-1 shares 
information on weak signals of failure or blood quality issues (e.g. a strange look or colour to 
the blood) with Blood Centre BC 1-1, preventing unwanted consequences for patients such 
as blood safety incidents. The hospital does not wait until it is certain that there are blood 
quality issues before reporting to the blood centre. 
Failure reporting is displayed when Hospitals RB and WH in Cases 1-3 and 1-1 report blood 
safety incidents (e.g. severe reactions to transfusion or bacterially contaminated units) to their 
Blood Centre. This reporting is crucial as a single donation is often split into a number of 
products which can be delivered to different hospitals. These hospitals are not only 
demonstrating resilience by immediately reporting incidents to the blood centre, but are also 
being cautious, endeavouring to prevent incidents in other hospitals caused by using blood 
products coming from the same donation. The Blood Transfusion Coordinator and Quality 
Lead at WH Hospital describes: 
“If we think that it looks like bacterially contaminated units, we would be talking to NHSBT and 
highlighting that. And if we had a particularly nasty reaction, we would phone NHSBT up anyway. 
Because more than one product is made from the one donation and we’ve had particularly nasty 
reactions, often NHSBT would then recall all the other products just to be safe.” INT - Blood 
Transfusion Coordinator and Quality Lead WH Hospital Case 1-1
Additionally, all hospitals in Context-1 report failures via a national incident reporting system. 
This system is used to generate annual lessons learnt reports which help BSC actors identify 
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errors and improve their BSA. The reported failures include but are not limited to delays in 
transfusion, incorrect labels, incorrect transfusion, and incorrect cross-match.
In Context-2, PMU Hospital demonstrates precaution when they share their blood donation 
plan with Blood Centre 2-1 to prevent blood stockouts. In addition, KI Hospital reports recurrent 
blood quality issues to Blood Centre 2-1 so that the cause can be traced at source. As the 
Laboratory Manager in Hospital KI describes: 
“If for example there is a complaint from the ward, “why are there often clots in the blood?”. We 
receive the complaint and phone the blood centre, “why are there always clots in the blood? It’s 
difficult to transfuse to patients”.” INT – Laboratory Manager KI Hospital Case 2-1
Reluctance to simplify (RS) 
Our findings show that BSC actors demonstrate their reluctance to simplify their actions and 
processes through the IOIS behaviours of redundancy, scepticism, and checks and balances 
in both normal and high tempo conditions in all cases and in emergency conditions in Context-
1. Under normal conditions, BSC actors in all cases employ redundancy, when they ensure 
that BSA related information is received and understood by employing multiple information 
sharing mediums (e.g. combining meetings, website, and email or combining order form and 
telephone to convey the same message). Sceptical of other actors actions, they create 
systems which do not presuppose that the precautions are sufficient, continuously questioning 
and confirming their actions through information sharing.  
For example, in Case 1-2 the blood centre questions unexplained orders for fresh blood (high 
remaining shelf life) from hospitals, ensuring that requests are made for justified clinical 
purposes. This avoids unnecessary use of fresh blood for transfusion, which can lead to 
overstocking and wastage. As Hospital Services Manager in Blood Centre BC 1-2 reports:
“If we notice that something is out of the ordinary that they have ordered, we might question and 
say “did you want to speak with the clinician?”, we might question it if they order really out of 
ordinary.” INT – Hospital Services Manager BC 1-2 Case 1-2
In Context-2, several hospitals do not have their own blood banks. When these hospitals order 
blood, they effectively reserve the blood units in the blood centre’s cold store. To ensure that 
the ordered blood is not wasted, the blood centre will regularly question whether the ordered 
blood is still required by the hospital. The following respondent illustrates this: 
 “When the patient has gone home, there is then a decision that the blood is not used. It can be 
that the blood centre phones us or we phone the blood centre to cancel the [ordered and 
reserved] blood, [because] it’s not going to be used.” INT – Midwife SD Hospital Case 2-2. 
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In high tempo conditions, such as when a blood product is recalled, blood centres in Context-
1 cases are sceptical, requiring written evidence from the hospital documenting that the unit 
has been withdrawn from stock. Further, to ensure blood availability during the Christmas 
period, blood centres employ checks and balances by sharing their updated blood inventory 
policies with the hospitals. Requiring that hospitals clinically justify orders for fresh blood 
during this time. As the following excerpt suggests:  
“But over Christmas periods for example, we want our customers not to be ordering long 
life products. We want them to be using the stocks as they turn. We regularly as a matter 
of process issue an instruction, “we are in FIFO situation, please don’t order for stock, if 
you do order for stock then give us a justification and a reason.” INT – Hospital Services 
Manager BC 1-3 Case 1-3
Hospitals in Context-2 also demonstrate their reluctance to simplify when they confirm errors, 
e.g. incorrect labels on blood products, with the blood centre. Further, during the fasting month 
of Ramadhan, high tempo conditions persist as Muslims, including most of Indonesians, do 
not eat and drink from sunrise to sunset and many people are reluctant to donate blood for 
faith or health reasons. It is therefore difficult to maintain blood availability across the BSC. 
Blood centres employ checks and balances to ensure blood stocks, asking hospitals to confirm 
blood usage to avoid wastage. A Midwife at the SD Hospital emphasises: 
“But here is the fact [when it comes to order during fasting month, the blood centre will 
question], “is it really going to be used? Because this is fasting month”.” INT – Midwife SD 
Hospital Case 2-2 
In emergency conditions, hospitals in Context-1 employ redundancy when they share urgent 
order information by telephone in addition to using the Online Blood Ordering System (OBOS), 
to ensure the immediate attention of blood centre staff. Emergency situations often occur at 
night, when the number of staff in the blood centre is reduced and staff have responsibilities 
in addition to order processing. As an Operational Manager Transfusion and Haematology at 
the NG Hospital describes:  
“And then in the emergency situations, we still use OBOS, but we also follow that up with 
the phone call to NHSBT [...]. We ring them directly because you know we are aware 
certainly overnight, there might only be one person, one member of staff. They are maybe 
in a fridge somewhere stocking up. They may not notice the order coming through on 
OBOS. So we always follow up for emergencies with a phone call.” INT – Operational 
Manager Transfusion and Haematology NG Hospital Case 1-2 
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Sensitivity to operations (SO) 
We find that BSC actors demonstrate their sensitivity to operations through the IOIS processes 
of transparency, regular and real time interactions and ongoing operational adjustments, 
across all cases in Context-1 and Case 2-1 in Context-2.  
Hospitals in Context-1 show transparency when they share daily blood stock levels, usage, 
and wastage data with blood centres via their data management system, VANESA. This 
information is shared back with the hospitals as monthly trend reports, allowing hospitals to 
benchmark their operations against BSC system performance at the local, regional, and 
national levels, potentially improving blood safety and availability.  
In addition to regular and real time interactions, the BSC actors in Context-1 also implement 
ongoing operational adjustments to prevent errors from cumulating. For example, when 
hospitals realise that the wastage of a particular blood group is increasing, they act to adjust 
(reduce) their stock levels and therefore their orders to the blood centre to reduce wastage. 
Similarly, when hospitals realise that they require additional stocks to fulfil patient demand, 
they share the information with the blood centre. As a Biomedical Scientist at the SM Hospital 
suggests: 
“[…] our thing, recently has been platelets, this is obviously because they’ve got a short shelf life 
anyway. We did go through a period where we were using a lot of ad hoc deliveries so we were 
feeding that back and obviously NHSBT are aware that we are using a lot of ad hoc deliveries. 
And through discussion with our customer service manager we actually decided to hold stock of 
platelets. And now we’ve adjusted that to hold the stock, two stock platelets over the weekend. 
So that’s something we’ve been able to put in place, feeding back and forth between ourselves 
and NHSBT.” INT – Lead Biomedical Scientist SM Hospital Case 1-2
In Case 2-1, transparency is demonstrated when the blood centre and its associated hospitals 
share temperature control information and collectively monitor blood quality conformance. 
Regular interactions are maintained when the blood centre staff visit hospitals to carry out 
monthly process audits and to disseminate blood management updates. The blood centre 
provides hospitals access to live information on blood stock levels on its website and social 
media, demonstrating real time interactions. Finally, hospitals make ongoing operational 
adjustments by immediately sharing order information responding to changes in their stock 
levels. As a Laboratory Manager at the PMU Hospital describes: 
“I always monitor blood stock every day. So for example, we have 10 stock in one day. Tomorrow 
morning when we come, we will check how many stocks we need. We then immediately call the 
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blood centre, that very morning we order again. We don’t want the delay.” INT – Laboratory 
Manager PMU Hospital Case 2-1
Commitment to resilience (CR) 
We find that BSC actors demonstrate their commitment to resilience through the IOIS 
behaviours of readiness and responsiveness in high tempo and emergency conditions, in all 
cases.  
Hospitals and blood centres in Context-1 demonstrate both readiness and responsiveness 
when they follow known procedures efficiently in high tempo conditions.  For example, when 
a patient suffers a severe reaction to a transfusion, the hospital will immediately share 
information with the blood centre to confirm the actions required or when a blood centre 
identifies a problem with blood units which have already been delivered to hospitals, a product 
recall instruction will be shared with the hospitals, requiring them to immediately take the 
product out of stock and circulation. Responsive information sharing is vital to ensure changes 
to operations can be actioned efficiently, ensuring blood safety for patients, particularly if the 
recalled product has already been transfused. Similarly, in Context-2, hospitals show 
responsiveness by contacting the blood centre immediately when a severe reaction to 
transfusion is identified or in response to stock-outs. 
In emergency conditions, such as a natural disaster, for example a flood in a manufacturing 
centre in Context-1, information is immediately shared between NHSBT and the hospitals to 
ensure all parties are aware of the situation and operations are responsively adjusted to 
maintain blood safety and availability across the BSC. As the Transfusion Operations Manager 
at BNH hospital reports: 
“[…] We were involved obviously with Filton [flood] and then they kept us up to speed. But the 
local distribution centres were able to supply our components and we were informed […]. We’d 
also be communicating with the NHSBT to say that “all of the deliveries and the components will 
be going to one site”. And we may well be looking at shipping components temporarily back to 
them for storage and then bringing them back. […] It tends to be phone because those sort of 
circumstances we’ll tend to need an immediate response or rapid response and I think relying on 
email is not conducive for speedy action.” INT – Transfusion Operations Manager BNH Hospital 
Case 1-3
In the event of a major haemorrhage, the patient bleeds heavily and will often use up all of the 
blood stock available in a hospital. In this situation in both Contexts, an emergency (blue light) 
order is shared with the blood centre. This will allow blood stocks to be replenished as quickly 
as possible. As the Blood Bank Manager in AK Hospital describes: 
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“So there was a case of an obstetric patient that was heavily bleeding and requires 6 packs of 
blood. I think it was O [pos] blood group so it was easier to fulfil. But then several hours later, this 
patient requires more. […] It was stockout because the need was higher than [expected]. We 
then immediately placed an emergency order by phoning the blood centre. We could then provide 
the blood.” INT – Blood Bank Manager AK Hospital Case 2-2 
Deference to expertise (DE) 
Our findings show that the BSC actors demonstrate deference to expertise through collective 
and expertise-based decision making in normal and high tempo conditions only in case 1-2 of 
Context-1. For example, in normal conditions collective decision making is identified when 
BSC actors share information to collectively determine ideal stock levels. Expertise-based 
decision making is shown when the blood centre provides advice on appropriate blood use 
whilst leaving the final decision to the hospital clinician. As the Hospital Services Manager at 
the BC 1-2 Blood Centre suggests: 
“[…] we wouldn’t make that judgement call, it would be with the clinician. So we wouldn’t say to 
the hospital that you need this instead of this. But we might advise.” INT – Hospital Services 
Manager BC 1-2 Case 1-2
In high tempo conditions, collective decision making is demonstrated when BSC actors in 
Case 1-2 collectively review their stock levels and suggest actions in response to a national 
blood shortage. In the case of a serious reaction to transfusion, expertise based decision 
making is shown when the blood centre defers the product recall decision to the consultant 
haematologist, who will then collectively review the reaction with the hospitals and decide 
whether the units need to be recalled. As a Transfusion Practitioner at the WP Hospital 
describes: 
“So if we have a serious reaction, the protocol is that we would contact NHSBT. They would give 
us the name of the consultant haematologist on call for NHSBT and they review that reaction 
with us. And then they will make the decision as to whether that unit needs to be recalled or not. 
If they want it recalled, we obviously quarantine that unit. And then they will send a box, we pack 
it and everything, it goes back to NHSBT, and then they will culture the units and then NHSBT 
then send us the report back on their findings. […] So it’s a telephone conversation. And 
occasionally they might ask for additional information via email.” INT – Transfusion Practitioner 
WP Hospital Case 1-2 
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Changes in blood safety and availability (BSA) 
Our analysis suggests that the demonstration of CM principles can explain the underlying 
mechanisms that are responsible for the changes in BSA in the Cases of both contexts, under 
a range of operational conditions. We categorise the changes into five groups:  
1. Realised improvement in BSA – changes that reflect actual improvements in BSA 
compared to before IOIS. For example, BSC actors demonstrate their sensitivity to 
operations when real time blood stock level information is shared between a blood 
centre and its associated hospital under the vendor-managed inventory (VMI) 
programme. This results in more effective replenishment of the hospital’s blood stock, 
and better blood availability across the BSC, compared to before VMI. 
2. Potential improvement in BSA – changes that could potentially lead to an improvement 
in BSA after IOIS. For example, BSC actors demonstrate their preoccupation with 
failure when they share blood safety incident reports across the BSC. Awareness of 
these lessons learnt can lead hospitals to change their practices, potentially preventing 
similar incidents happening in the future.  
3. Assurance of BSA – the prevention of unwanted changes that could potentially lead to 
worse BSA. For example, our data suggests that BSC actors demonstrate 
preoccupation with failure when a blood centre questions out of the ordinary orders 
from their hospital to ensure that the order is appropriate and the hospital is using the 
ordered blood safely. 
4. Adjustment of operations for BSA – making changes (which can be temporal in nature) 
to maintain BSA after IOIS. For example, BSC actors demonstrate their sensitivity to 
operations and commitment to resilience when hospitals are notified of a shortage in 
a critical blood group such as O negative. Hospitals will then adjust their practices, to 
reduce usage of the critical group to maintain the availability across the BSC.  
5. Potential adjustment of operations for BSA – potential changes to operations to 
maintain BSA after IOIS. For example, showing sensitivity to operations, a hospital 
might inform its associated blood centre of changes in medical practice, which will 
subsequently increase the demand for a particular blood group. This awareness allows 
the blood centre to adjust their services to meet demand and maintain blood availability 
across the BSC.
Table 3 presents the relationship between these changes and the CM principles, for each 
context across the range of operational conditions investigated, normal (N), high tempo (HT), 
and emergency (E). 
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√ - - √ √ - √ √ - - √ - √ √ - 
Reluctance to 
simplify 
√ - - √ √ √ √ √ √ √ - √ √ √ √ 
Sensitivity to 
operations 
√ - - √ - - √ - - √ - - √ - - 
Commitment to 
resilience 
- √ - - √ - - √ √ - √ √ - √ √ 
Deference to 
expertise 




- - - √ - - √ - - - - - √ - - 
Sensitivity to 
operations
- - - √ - - √ - - √ - - √ - - 
Commitment to 
resilience 
- - - - - - - √ - - - √ - √ √ 
Discussion 
Our analysis, summarised in Table 3, shows that the BSC actors in the cases in Context-1 are 
more collectively mindful, demonstrating more CM principles across a wider range of 
operational conditions compared to the BSC actors in the cases in Context-2. Further, the 
greater number of CM principles demonstrated in the cases of Context-1 result in more 
positive changes in BSA compared to those found in the cases of Context-2. These results 
indicate that demonstrating CM through IOIS in the cases of Context-1 not only assures BSA 
in response to dynamic changes in the environment, but also improves BSA performance 
across the BSC. This pattern is not widely observed in cases of Context-2, which focusses on 
adjustment of operations to achieve BSA. This leads to our first proposition: 
P1: The demonstration of more collective mindfulness principles leads to a greater number of 
positive changes in blood safety and availability in the supply chain. 
Our research contributes to the elaboration of CM theory via vertical and horizontal contrasting
(Fisher and Aguinis, 2017). Applying vertical contrasting we use a theory developed at one 
level of analysis to explain a phenomenon at another level of analysis, proposing an 
elaborated understanding of CM that goes beyond the perspective of a single organisation 
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(see Lekka, 2011; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2015, 2007; Weick et al., 1999). Our results reveal that, 
for our cases, the demonstrations of CM principles at the supply chain level (Figure 2) are not 
entirely consistent with the original theory (Figure 1). This corroborates Weick et al. (1999) 
who predict the complexity and challenges faced when CM theory is adopted in the inter-
organisational context. They suggest that “reliability will be an emerging concern as 
organizations increasingly participate in interorganizational networks because 
interorganizational coordination is so difficult to achieve and because the system becomes 
more complex and harder to comprehend” (Weick et al., 1999:57). This leads us to our second 
proposition: 
P2: Collective mindfulness principles are demonstrated differently at the supply chain 
compared to the organisational level.
Our vertical contrasting also finds that some CM principles are demonstrated more 
dynamically in the BSC context (Figure 2), being observed in conditions beyond those 
prescribed in the original theory (Figure 1). For example, CM theory posits that, to maintain 
high reliability performance in an organisation, the principles of preoccupation with failure (PF), 
reluctance to simplify (RS), and sensitivity to operations (SO) should be demonstrated before 
disruptive events occur, as they represent proactive approaches to error detection. Whereas, 
commitment to resilience (CR) and deference to expertise (DE) should be demonstrated to 
contain unexpected events once they have happened (see Weick and Sutcliffe, 2015, 2007; 
Weick et al., 1999). Our research, however, reveals that in our cases PF is demonstrated not 
only in normal, but also in high tempo conditions. Similarly, we find that the principle of RS is 
demonstrated not only in normal, but also in high tempo and emergency conditions. This 
indicates that, when facing disruptions, BSC actors are not only responsive, immediately 
resolving blood safety and availability (BSA) problems by sharing information, but they are 
simultaneously focusing on the future reliability of the system and attempting to prevent further 
problems from emerging that could potentially affect BSA. In doing so, they are demonstrating 
a process mindset towards reliability, being mindful of the events occurring now and in the 
future rather than relying on absolute statistical values. This leads to our third proposition: 
P3: Collective mindfulness principles are demonstrated more dynamically in the supply chain 
level compared to the organisational level i.e. more principles are demonstrated in more 
operational conditions. 
In addition, whilst we find examples of the demonstration of DE in normal and high tempo 
conditions, we find that in general it is difficult to identify across the investigated cases. CM 
theory in the organisational context posits that DE is about demonstrating collective rather 
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than authoritative (top-down) decision making, sharing information regardless of hierarchical 
rank, and allowing decision making to migrate, along with problems, to people with relevant 
expertise (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick et al., 1999). However, organisational hierarchy 
is less applicable in the supply chain context, where actors have more autonomy and clarity 
of responsibility and roles is more important for inter-organisational information sharing (IOIS) 
and therefore decision making (see Yang and Maxwell, 2011). Our findings suggest that blood 
centres and their associated hospitals have equal power, being bound by the service level 
agreement not hierarchy. In addition, both blood centres and hospitals have their own blood 
management expertise, therefore, migration of decision making beyond supply and demand 
issues is unnecessary. As a Chief Biomedical Scientist the Transfusion Manager at the W 
Hospital emphasises: 
I think we do cover the blood safety quality regulations, vein to vein traceability and safety. […] 
so from NHS[BT] from vein of donor all the way through to delivery to me, NHSBT are responsible 
for and services delivered to me until the fate of the unit, be it transfused or wasted, that's my 
responsibility. […] And I think between the two organisations you know they've got clear 
demarcation lines on what they're responsible for and likewise we've got our clear 
embarkation lines and I don't think there's any mix up of where their liability stops and where ours 
starts and finishes. I think it's quite clear and I think communication works quite well. I don't think 
we’ve got any issues or had any issues. […] they look after their information and we look after 
ours. INT – Chief Biomedical Scientist the Transfusion Manager W Hospital Case 1-1
Using horizontal contrasting, we examine the application of the theory in contexts different to 
the original setting (Fisher and Aguinis, 2017). We offer an additional insight on the application 
of CM theory beyond typical high hazard organisations (e.g. nuclear power plants, aircraft 
carriers, air traffic controls) in which the theory was originally developed (see Weick et al., 
1999).  Our findings build on previous research which has demonstrated the positive impacts 
of CM in healthcare operations (e.g. Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007a, b; Vogus et al., 2010). 
Governmental approaches to healthcare delivery differ across the world with four major 
approaches being observed (WHO, 2020; Dobrzykowski, 2019). The healthcare funding 
model adopted in a country has a significant impact on how the healthcare supply chain 
operates, in particular how it is structured and regulated.  By choosing contrasting contexts for 
our cases in countries with radically different healthcare delivery systems, our research 
explores how structure and regulation impact on how SC actors demonstrate CM principles 
and the influence this has on the reliability of the SC. This has not been found in the extant 
literature (see Pirabán et al., 2019; Sawyerr and Harrison, 2020).  
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Despite some common mechanisms found in both contexts which explain how CM influences 
BSA (Figure 2), this research suggests that the BSC actors in the cases in the more centralised 
and tightly regulated setting demonstrate more CM principles and thus are collectively more 
mindful than those in the cases in the more decentralised and loosely regulated setting. Whilst 
our research cannot answer why this happens, this research corroborates the extant literature 
which argues that some degree of centralisation is required to be collectively mindful and to 
improve the reliability of operations (Rijpma, 1997 as cited in Weick et al., 1999). On the other 
hand, “excess decentralization can weaken the comprehension of wider threats and the 
capacity to coordinate responses”, therefore creating a lower collective mindfulness 
environment (see Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007:150).  This leads to our fourth proposition: 
P4: The structure of the supply chain has a key influence on how collective mindfulness 
principles are demonstrated by supply chain actors and hence how blood safety and 
availability can be improved. 
Interestingly, contrary to the findings of earlier studies (see La Porte and Thomas, 1995; 
Lekka, 2011; Butler and Gray, 2006; Kutsch et al., 2013; Sitkin et al., 1994; Weick et al., 1999), 
our research suggests that tighter regulation supports rather than hinders the wider 
demonstration of CM principles in the BSC. Whilst further research is required to prove this 
proposition at the supply chain level, the extant literature has addressed this phenomenon at 
the organisational level. Studies suggest that organisations are increasingly reliant on a mix 
of routine-based and mindfulness-based reliability (Andersen and Hanstad, 2013; Butler and 
Gray 2006; Turner et al., 2016). Whilst being compliant with rules and procedures, 
organisations can “infuse” CM elements not only under normal conditions, but also during 
times of incidents and major crises (Turner et al., 2016). In this regard, tight regulation can be 
simultaneously coupled with the demonstration of CM to create a robust system leading to 
reliable performance (see La Porte and Thomas, 1995). This leads to our final proposition: 
P5: At the supply chain level, tight regulation supports the demonstration of collective 
mindfulness principles and therefore improvement in blood safety and availability. 
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Figure 2: Refined theoretical framework of collective mindfulness in the blood supply chain
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Conclusions 
This research aims to investigate how BSC actors demonstrate CM principles through their 
IOIS behaviour and how these demonstrations lead to BSA improvements in different 
operational contexts and conditions. Our results find that CM principles are demonstrated by 
BSC actors in all cases and operational conditions, but that more CM principles are 
demonstrated under more operational conditions leading to more improvements in BSA in the 
cases in the more centralised and tightly regulated context. We therefore contribute a vertical 
elaboration of CM theory beyond the organisational to the supply chain context, proposing that 
at this level of analysis more CM principles are demonstrated more dynamically than is 
suggested by the organisational level theory. In addition, we propose a horizontal elaboration 
of CM theory, presenting a theoretical examination of a context where little theory has been 
developed. We find that in our cases, studying the CM behaviours of the BSC actors provides 
a process driven behaviourally related model for improving reliability in a context which has 
traditionally been driven by quantitative analysis. In our cases we find that the demonstration 
of more CM principles leads more positive changes in BSA and that structure and regulation 
are important contributing factors. We summarise our contribution by offering five propositions 
to guide future work in the application of CM as a powerful tool for developing process reliability 
approaches in the blood supply chain context and beyond. 
Our research is limited to studying CM principles and their impacts on BSA across cases in 
different operational contexts. Our propositions offer a potential vehicle for understanding how 
CM principles can be used to develop process reliability based mechanisms in other supply 
chain contexts. Understanding how and why the contexts affect the results is beyond our 
scope and future research could focus on this interesting area. Our limitation also stems from 
the use of CM theory developed from the Western perspective of individual mindfulness. Other 
mindfulness perspectives involving meditation as commonly found in the Eastern practices of 
mindfulness are not considered in this study. Furthermore, although the multiple case study 
investigated in this research offers stronger and more compelling empirical insights compared 
to a single case study, it is the nature of case study research that the generalisability of the 
findings is limited to theoretical or analytical, rather than statistical generalisation (Yin, 2014). 
As such, the findings of this research do not represent the general populations to which the 
investigated cases belong; instead, these findings may be applied with care to explain similar 
phenomena in similar study contexts, such as perishable product and/or healthcare SCs. 
Large scale surveys could be conducted in the future to generalise our findings and to test the 
propositions.   
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